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Michael Tonry and Catrien Bijleveld
Crime, Criminal Justice, and
Criminology in the
Netherlands
The Netherlands is particularly appropriate as the subject of the first
Crime and Justice volume to focus on a single European country or
region. Its criminal justice policies have long been well known, its so-
cial policies and problems receive widespread international attention,
and it has among the longest and strongest research traditions in crim-
inology in Europe.
For nearly fifty years after World War II, the Netherlands was com-
monly portrayed as having the most liberal and humane criminal justice
system among Western countries (e.g., Downes 1988). In the early
twenty-first century it is sometimes viewed as having one of Europe's
most severe criminal justice systems, perhaps following that of England
and Wales (Downes 2007). By the end of 2006, many judges and law-
yers were complaining that the criminal law system had become over-
heated, with criminalization of behavior increasing and procedural
rights of defendants decreasing (Ippel and Heeger 2006).
During most of the postwar period, the Netherlands exemplified (at
least to outsiders) generous social welfare policies, sensible criminal
justice policies, and tolerant social attitudes. Drug policies were gen-
erally seen as pragmatic and lenient, as were abortion laws.
Social policies relating to ethnic minority groups seemed to be work-
ing. Immigrants from Indonesia after its independence were assimilated
Errors of analysis or fact in this introduction are alas our own, but we are grateful to
the following people who kindly read an earlier draft and helped us avoid some errors
and tried to save us from others: Gerben Bruinsma, Ybo Buruma, Henk van de Bunt,
David Downes, Edward Kleemans, Godfried Engbersen, Ren6 van Swaaningen, and Frank
Weerman.
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almost without notice. Subsequent waves of immigrants came from
former Dutch colonies in South America and the Caribbean, and es-
pecially from Turkey and Morocco, as guest workers and their families.
Most recently, sizable numbers of asylum seekers and their families
came to live in the Netherlands. For the most part, Dutch policies
supported maintenance of immigrants' cultural traditions and did not
pressure them to assimilate.
By the end of the twentieth century, and early in the twenty-first,
changes were becoming evident. Welfare provision had become less
generous, criminal justice policies hardened, and policies concerning
immigrants and refugees became stricter. Right-wing political parties
and anti-inmigrant politicians exemplified widespread feelings that
Dutch multiculturalism had failed (Buruma, in this volume; Engbersen,
van der Leun, and de Boom, in this volume).
The Netherlands has long been internationally prominent in crim-
inology and criminal justice research. The Ministry of Justice Research
and Documentation Centre (the WODC, its acronym in Dutch) is
among the best-known government research agencies in Europe and
among the most internationalist. The International Crime Victims Sur-
vey (e.g., van Kesteren, Mayhew, and Nieuwbeerta 2001), the Inter-
national Self-Report Delinquency Study (e.g., Junger-Tas, Haen Mar-
shall, and Ribeaud 2003), and the European Sourcebook of Crime and
Criminal Justice Statistics (e.g., Aebi et al. 2006) have all at various times
found their homes there. Widespread English fluency has meant that
Dutch research is well known elsewhere. The Netherlands Institute
for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement (NSCR, another Dutch
acronym), jointly supported by the National Organization for Scientific
Research, the Ministry of Justice, and Leiden University, is one of
Europe's few independent, stably funded research institutes specializ-
ing in mid- and long-term fundamental research on crime and the
justice system. Dutch scholars were prominent in the creation in 2000
of the European Society of Criminology and in its subsequent devel-
opment.
The essays in this volume discuss the development of Dutch criminal
justice policies and research and provide comprehensive overviews of
research areas in which Dutch research is especially strong and Dutch
researchers are especially prolific. In this essay we provide a backdrop
to what follows. Sections I-II provide thumbnail sketches of the coun-
try, its population, and its criminal justice system. The Netherlands is
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densely populated, particularly in the West. Big-city populations, es-
pecially among the young, are increasingly non-Dutch. The economy
is strong, unemployment rates are low, and income inequality is rela-
tively modest (but growing). As in most of western Europe, criminal
justice officials are neither elected nor politically selected, and most are
career civil servants.
Section IV sketches crime and punishment trends. Dutch crime
trends do not stand out in a European context. Dutch incarceration
trends do. Crime trends-broadly rising from the 1970s through the
1990s and stabilizing or falling since then (for property offenses, fall-
ing, for sure; the evidence is less clear concerning violence)-parallel
those of most western European countries (e.g., Bijleveld and Smit
2005; Aebi et al. 2006). However, they stand out concerning impris-
onment: incarceration rates per 100,000 have increased continuously
since the early 1970s, when they were the lowest in Europe. The three-
decade rate of increase is by a wide margin the largest in Europe,
rivaling that of the United States during the same period (though from
a much lower starting point).
Section V, necessarily impressionistic and idiosyncratic, is our effort
to generalize about criminological and criminal justice research in the
Netherlands. Research on organized crime, organizational crime, ju-
venile delinquency, some kinds of violent offending, and ethnicity and
crime is especially rich. Research on criminal justice system opera-
tions-police, prosecutors, courts, probation, and prisons-and on
women and crime, costs of crime, and cost- and treatment-effectiveness
is comparatively meager. The strategic implications for research pri-
orities and funding are straightforward.
I. The Netherlands'
The Netherlands, small and densely populated, has historically been
perceived as a tolerant and at times permissive country. The Dutch
have long been known for their practicality and their trading spirit.
They have for as long been and still are commonly characterized as
down-to-earth, frugal, and unostentatious. Wim Kok often bicycled to
Unless otherwise indicated, demographic, economic, social, and other statistical data
used in this and the following section were obtained from the Netherlands' Central Bureau
of Statistics (http://www.cbs.nl).
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work in The Hague and to visit the queen when he was prime minister,
as did Piet Hein Donner when he was minister of justice.
Many a dissident writer printed his books in the Netherlands begin-
ning in the late Middle Ages (e.g., Bayle, Erasmus, Luther, Spinoza).
Waves of migrants and refugees fleeing persecution settled there, no-
tably including Sephardic Jews in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies, French Huguenots in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
and many former residents (mainly of mixed descent) from the former
Dutch East Indies. The Puritans who settled Massachusetts Bay Col-
ony, the first permanent English-speaking settlement in America, shel-
tered in Leiden for a decade to escape persecution in England before
leaving for America.
Many liberal social policies remain. Dutch drug policy is famous for
its pragmatism and permissiveness and for its irreconcilable elements
(users may legally buy small amounts of soft drugs in designated shops,
but there are no legal markets in which shop owners may buy their
supplies) (Leuw 1991). Same-sex partners may marry and adopt chil-
dren. Prostitution is legalized. So is euthanasia under certain circum-
stances. Private possession of firearms is prohibited.
The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary
democracy. The queen, aside from symbolic constitutional functions,
plays mainly a ceremonial role. The lower house (Tweede Kamer),
which plays the central role, has 150 seats, and the upper (Eerste Ka-
mer) has 75.
The Netherlands has long been ruled by coalition governments.
Starting in 1994, a coalition of Christian-democratic, liberal-conser-
vative, and liberal-democratic parties made up the governing coalition.
Following an election in 2002 held shortly after the murder of the
flamboyant populist and anti-immigrant politician Pim Fortuyn, the
Dutch government moved distinctly to the right. A coalition of reli-
gious, conservative and liberal democratic parties took office, and pol-
icy on a number of high-visibility subjects-support for the U.S.-led
war in Iraq, treatment of immigrants, criminal justice-shifted. The
subsequent murder of filmmaker and provocateur Theo van Gogh,
who made a practice of insulting unassimilated Muslims, produced still
harsher attitudes toward immigrants and heightened doubts about the
wisdom and effects of Holland's traditional multicultural approach to-
ward assimilation.
Demographic characteristics resemble those of other affluent Eu-
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ropean countries. The population is aging fast. Life expectancy in 2001
was 75.8 for males and 80.7 for females. About one in three marriages
ends in divorce. About one in four children is born out of wedlock,
and one in six lives in a single-parent household. All children aged five
to fifteen receive full-time education. About 22 percent of the popu-
lation between fifteen and sixty-four is in or has received higher edu-
cation; this figure has been increasing in recent years. The unemploy-
ment rate is low, as is inflation. Most households have one or more
cars. There are more bicycles than people. Many people use them (or
mopeds) for transportation since the country is flat, towns are con-
gested, and distances are short.
The Netherlands is an advanced social welfare state: those without
jobs are entitled to income and other support. Levels of financial sup-
port have recently decreased, and eligibility rules have tightened, but
no legal resident in the Netherlands need go hungry or without a place
to live. Families with children receive child benefits. Medical care for
legal residents is provided under state-supervised insurance schemes,
and health insurance subsidies are provided to people with incomes
below designated levels.
The relaxed and tolerant atmosphere of earlier times has changed
in recent years. Pim Fortuyn was murdered by an animal rights ac-
tivist and Theo van Gogh by a jihadist of Moroccan origin. Antiter-
rorism laws have been enacted. Closed-circuit television is in oper-
ation in many places. The Somali-born liberal-conservative
parliamentarian Ayaan Hirsi Ali and the extreme right-wing politician
Geert Wilders have been threatened because of their radical views
(Buruma 2006).
11. The People
The Netherlands is rapidly becoming a multiethnic, multicultural
country. Only 9.2 percent of the population in 1972 were of non-
ethnic Dutch origin; 1.2 percent were of non-Western origin. By
2006, people who were foreign-born or had at least one foreign-born
parent made up 19.3 percent of the population; more than half, 10.5
percent, were of non-Western origin. Citizens of Dutch ethnic or
other Western descent are generally wealthier, better educated, better
employed, healthier, and less involved in violent and property crimes
than non-Western minority residents (particularly younger ones).
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There are big differences, however, between and within minority eth-
nic groups.
Large cities have concentrations of lower-income minorities and in-
digenous Dutch, but there are no residential areas equivalent to the
urban ghettos of the United States or the banlieus of Paris. Dutch peo-
ple generally dislike racial and ethnic categories and labels, perhaps
because of the persecution of Dutch Jews by German occupiers during
World War II: 70 percent of Jewish inhabitants were deported and
killed, including 90 percent of those in Amsterdam. Perhaps for this
reason, records of individuals' racial characteristics are not maintained.
In official statistics, residents are identified as non-ethnic Dutch when
at least one parent was born outside the Netherlands.
The composition of the Dutch population has never before changed
as rapidly as in the past four decades. After the relatively easy integra-
tion of people from the former Dutch East Indies after Indonesia be-
came independent in 1949, retroactively formalized as from 1945, labor
migrants mainly from Turkey and Morocco made up the next big wave
of immigrants. Their stays were initially envisioned as temporary, but
most settled. Their families came later, and their descendants make up
a growing part of the population.
Almost all Turkish and Moroccan migrants are Muslims. Turkish
migrants came mainly from rural areas in central and eastern Turkey.
Many are ethnic Kurds. The Moroccans mainly came from the poor
rural area called the Rif. Most are Berbers, not ethnic Arabs, and speak
Tamazight, a Berber language, as a first language and Arabic as a sec-
ond.
Postindependence migrants from the former colony of Dutch Guy-
ana (now Surinam) came to the Netherlands in large numbers around
1975, just before Surinam became independent. Its inhabitants were
given the choice to remain in Surinam or to settle in the Netherlands.
Most Surinamese speak Dutch. Their ethnic makeup is diverse and
includes descendants of people brought as laborers to Surinam from
the Indian subcontinent, Africa, Java, and China.
The Netherlands Antilles remain part of the kingdom of the Neth-
erlands. Travel is not unrestricted, but many (mostly young male) An-
tilleans have settled in the Netherlands, more or less permanently.
They often do not speak Dutch, but Papiamento.
More recent migrant groups, mostly asylum seekers (prominently
from Iraq, China, Iran, Afghanistan, and Somalia), have augmented the
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nonindigenous population. Many who obtain a residence permit sub-
sequently seek and obtain approval for migration by relatives for family
reunification or formation.
Many nonindigenous Dutch migrants, particularly from the former
Dutch East Indies, have successfully integrated, but this is less true for
many of the more recent migrants. Many non-Western immigrants live
in the big towns (about a third each of the populations of Amsterdam
and Rotterdam in 2002 were of non-Western descent). A sizable frac-
tion occupies the country's lower socioeconomic strata. Those with
refugee status and families of Moroccan origin are especially likely to
be found there.
The employment rate for non-Western migrants is worse than for
indigenous Dutch: 73 percent of indigenous Dutch were employed in
2003, compared with 56 percent of nonindigenous Dutch and 51 per-
cent of non-Western residents. The data for unemployment benefits
are similar: 13 percent of indigenous Dutch are in some kind of un-
employment scheme compared with 16 percent of Western migrants
and 25 percent of non-Western migrants. Among asylum migrants the
unemployment rate was 23-40 percent for males and 38-70 percent
for females (Bijl et al. 2005). Children from ethnic minority families
finish school less often and with lower degrees than children from
ethnically Dutch families, and the gap is not decreasing significantly;
girls overall do better than boys (Bijl et al. 2005).
Members of some ethnic minority groups are overrepresented in
Dutch crime statistics. Of all registered suspects in 2002, 62.5 percent
were ethnically Dutch and 37.5 percent were from other groups. Over-
all, 1.6 percent of male ethnic Dutch residents were identified in police
data systems as a suspect; among non-ethnic Dutch males, 4.2 percent
were. Among ethnic Dutch and other females, the corresponding fig-
ures are 0.3 percent and 0.8 percent (Blom et al. 2005). The overrep-
resentation is higher for juveniles: first-generation Antillean and Mo-
roccan juveniles' representation in police statistics is three times that
of Dutch juveniles, according to Blom et al. In Dutch prisons, 74 per-
cent of detainees have Dutch nationality; however, 50 percent were
born outside the Netherlands (Dienst Justitidle Inrichtingen [DJI]:
http://www.dji.nl/main.asp?pid = 40&sectorid = 2 &catid = 3, 2005).
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IIl. The Criminal Justice System2
Dutch police, prosecutors, and judges have wide discretionary powers.
During the closing decades of the twentieth century, the powers of the
police and the prosecution grew substantially. Their authority to dis-
pose of cases without referring them to the courts expanded substan-
tially. The judiciary has wide discretionary powers in sentencing. Leg-
islation establishes maximum sentences for particular crimes, and there
are no minimums.
A. Police
The police are divided into twenty-five regional forces. Each falls
under the administrative authority of the mayor of the largest city in
the region. The public prosecutor, however, is responsible for over-
seeing police investigations. A small national force handles specific
tasks (e.g., motorway policing, central criminal investigations, inter-
national contacts, international and war crimes). There is also a mili-
tary police force with several "civil" tasks, most notably border control
and Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport. Special agencies handle regulatory
offenses such as tax and social security fraud.
Suspects are processed first through the police system. When the
police decide that a suspect has committed a crime, the case in principle
should be transferred to the public prosecutor. In some cases, especially
for juveniles who have committed minor offenses, the police may send
the suspect home with a warning or a small fine and no prosecution
ensues. Since 1987, the police have had authority to handle less serious
offenses committed by juveniles by means of a HALT disposition,
which is usually a kind of community service. For driving offenses,
shoplifting, and other lesser property crimes, police can dispose of
cases on the condition that the suspect pays a fine; this is in effect a
lower-level version of the prosecutorial transactions described in the
next subsection. In other situations, the case is referred to the public
prosecutor's office.
B. Prosecution
The prosecutor's role is central. The prosecution is responsible for
overseeing the investigation and decides whether to prosecute or to
drop the case. The prosecution is authorized to deal with less serious
2 Junger-Tas (2004) and Tak (2001, 2003) respectively provide comprehensive overviews
of the Dutch juvenile and (adult) criminal justice systems.
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cases without referring them to the courts by means of "transactions"
(agreements that the suspect will accept a penalty that might have been
imposed had the case gone to trial) or other conditions for dismissal
of the case. The offender can refuse the offer (if so, the case will go
to court). One advantage for the offender is that agreement to a trans-
action will not result in a criminal record that will show up in a back-
ground check. Only a judge has authority to find a suspect guilty. This
means that there is no institutionalized "plea bargain," although the
transaction resembles one functionally.
Public prosecutors in the Netherlands, though appointed directly by
the minister of justice and the Crown, fall under a central office (the
Board of Procurators General, the Parket-Generaal) led by three to five
chief prosecutors. Prosecutors, unlike judges, are not appointed for life.
C. Courts
Judges are appointed for life by the minister of justice and the
Crown. Juries are not involved in the trial of cases, and lay judges are
almost absent. This is different from most surrounding countries,
where juries or lay judges without specialized academic training, or
both, play important roles trying cases and deciding punishments.
The courts of first instance consist of one judge (politierechter) for
less severe offenses (with authority to impose custodial sentences up to
six months) or three judges for the more serious cases (meervoudige
kamer). Appellate courts generally consist of three judges.
Most investigation is done by the police in the pretrial stage. Find-
ings are reported in the case file. Most of the time, no interrogation
of witnesses and experts takes place at the trial. Judges base their de-
cisions primarily on interrogations of suspects and written dossiers
(Malsch and Nijboer 1999). Interpreters are provided during trials and
interrogation to defendants who do not speak Dutch.
The media have access to criminal trials, but use of cameras is lim-
ited. Media coverage is generally limited to imposition of the sentence
or the start of a prosecution. Compared with media in other countries,
the Dutch media are relatively restrained in reporting about criminal
trials.
D. Punishment
Sanctions range from fines and community service to treatment mea-
sures (leerstraf) to imprisonment. All can be imposed conditionally as
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well as unconditionally. Sanctions can be punishments, which must be
proportionate to the offense, or measures (such as treatment), which
serve a more rehabilitative goal and need not be proportionate.
Especially for violent and sexual crimes, entrustment orders (ter-
beschikkingstelling, commonly called TBS) may be given, often in com-
bination with a prison sentence. An entrustment order can be imposed
for crimes carrying a statutory maximum sentence of four years or
more imprisonment, if the offender cannot be held fully responsible
for his or her behavior, and if hospital care is deemed necessary to
protect other people, the general public, or property. The order lasts
two years but may be extended. The average time spent on an entrust-
ment order is more than six years. Some on whom treatment is im-
posed may spend the rest of their lives in confinement if treatment is
unsuccessful and their chances of recidivism remain high (Leuw 1999).
Determinate custodial sentences vary between one day and twenty
years. Life sentences are seldom imposed (though their use has in-
creased in recent years). Sentence length depends on the severity of
the offense, whether the offender is a recidivist, and other case-specific
circumstances. Prisoners are entitled to release after serving a specified
percentage of their sentences. There is no system of discretionary pa-
role release.
All prisons are operated by the state. They are small, the largest
having a capacity of fewer than 400 cells. The total regular capacity
for adults (nonjuveniles, non-TBS) by the end of 2005 was 15,601 cells
(DJI 2007). Besides adult institutions, there are institutions for young
offenders, psychiatric institutions for offenders, and places for detained
illegal aliens who are subjects of civil administrative law proceedings.
Three-quarters of prisoners are in short-stay facilities that house pre-
trial detainees and persons serving short terms.
An inmate's quality of life in a Dutch prison is high, compared with
prisons elsewhere, at least in a material sense. Detainees can have a
television and video in their cell (at their own expense), and sports
activities are available. Prisoners serving long sentences may be granted
unsupervised visits.
In other respects, the regimes are strict and have recently become
stricter. Sentenced prisoners can be required to participate in prison
labor. Contacts with the outside world are strictly regulated. Because
of the rapid growth of the prison population, sharing of cells has been
allowed since 2003.
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IV. Crime and Punishment Trends3
Among European countries, the Netherlands stands out in the growth
over three decades of its imprisonment rate and its prison capacity and
population. Otherwise-in crime and victimization rates and trends,
changes in sanctioning policies and practices, and evolution of systems
of official data-it is in the mainstream. There is, however, some con-
fusion about imprisonment rates, and for some offenses there is some
uncertainty about crime rate trends.
A. Imprisonment Rates
The broad patterns are clear. The imprisonment rate grew steeply
and continuously for three decades from being the lowest in western
Europe to being one of the highest. In contrast to the United States
and England, other countries that experienced steeply rising impris-
onment rates over extended periods through 2006, the increase oc-
curred without enactment of dramatically harsher sentencing laws and
without crime control becoming a preoccupying partisan political issue.
Figure 1 shows the imprisonment rate per 100,000 population aged
fifteen to sixty-five for the period 1960-2005, including remand and
sentenced adult prisoners, juveniles detained under a criminal law or-
der, and TBS detainees. Represented in this way, the rate approxi-
mately halved between 1960 and the early 1970s and then quadrupled,
approaching 160 per 100,000 in 2005. Calculating imprisonment rates
this way adjusts demographically for the size of the population realis-
tically at risk of being in prison, but it is not generally the basis for
international comparisons.
International comparisons generally use imprisonment rates per
100,000 national population, but this can be misleading depending on
what subpopulations are included (e.g., adults only or including juve-
niles, whether illegal aliens, whether residents of psychiatric institu-
tions for offenders). Figure 2 shows the Dutch imprisonment rate per
100,000 general population and calculated to include the same cate-
gories of confined persons as in figure 1.
Dutch imprisonment rates are sometimes said to have increased six-
fold since 1973-74, but that is wrong and appears to result from com-
paring recent rates based on the population aged fifteen to sixty-five
' Bijleveld and Smit (2004, 2005) provide detailed analyses of crime and punishment
trends in 1980-99.
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FIG. 2.-Netherlands imprisonment rates per 100,000 population, 1960-2005. Sources:
1960-92: van Ruller and Beijers (1995); 1990-2005: http://www.wodc.nl/images/
6.01_tcml 1-135961 .pdf. Series 1960-92: average incarcerated population, includingTBS,
juveniles detained under a criminal law order, and patients in penitentiary hospitals. Series
1992-2005: average incarcerated population, including TBS and juveniles detained under
a criminal law order; 1992-99: number of aliens detained under civil law order estimated
as 10 percent of the total and deducted from totals published.
(150-160 per 100,000) with the 1973-74 rate based on the total pop-
ulation (mid-20s per 100,000).
Notwithstanding those qualifications, however, and whichever
method is used to calculate rates, Dutch use of imprisonment has in-
creased substantially and rapidly by European standards. Table 1, based
on Council of Europe data, shows imprisonment rates for selected Eu-
ropean countries in 2004.4 Among ten E.U. countries (out of fifteen)
for which data were available and Switzerland, only England and Wales
and Spain had higher imprisonment rates than the Netherlands; the
Dutch rates were nearly double those in Scandinavia and a third higher
than in France, Germany, and Italy.
Table 2 shows imprisonment rates from the Council of Europe for
4 The data shown in tables 1 and 2 are as reported to the Council of Europe by national
governments. The Dutch data, consistent over time, include categories of confined per-
sons (e.g., young persons confined under civil law orders) not included in our figs. 1 and
2.
14 Michael Tonry and Catrien Bijleveld
TABLE 1
Imprisonment Rates, Selected European Countries,
September 1, 2004
Number of
Population Prisoners Per 100,000
Country (2004) (2004) (9/1/2004)
Denmark 5,397,600 3,762 69.7
England and Wales 53,046,300 74,488 140.4
Finland 5,219,700 3,446 66
France 62,177,000 56,271 90.5
Germany 82,531,700 79,676 96.5
Italy 57,888,200 56,090 96.9
Netherlands 16,258,000 20,075 123.5
Norway 4,577,500 2,975 65
Spain 42,197,900 59,224 140.3
Sweden 8,975,700 7,332 81.7
Switzerland 7,364,100 6,021 81.8
SOURCE-Council of Europe (2005), table 1.
the same eleven countries in 1977, 1990, 1999, and 2004 and percent-
age changes from each prior year through 2004. In each period the
cumulative Dutch increase is substantially higher than any other. Over
the entire twenty-seven years the Dutch imprisonment rate grew 375
percent. Spain was next highest at 119 percent.
An interesting question is why imprisonment rates rose so rapidly
and for so long, especially in the absence of dramatic policy changes-
such as three-strikes and mandatory minimum sentence laws in En-
gland and the United States-meant to increase prison use dramati-
cally. Crime rates increased substantially in the 1970s, 1980s, and
1990s, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that led to increased im-
prisonment. In practice, however, comparative research shows that
there is no necessary relation between crime and imprisonment rates
(Tonry 2007). Parts of the explanation for the Dutch pattern are
known. A first, and the most mechanical, is that periodic expansions
in prison capacity have to some extent driven the size of the prison
population. Until 2003, the Netherlands observed a policy of one pris-
oner to a cell. When space was unavailable, both remand and sentenced
prisoners were placed on waiting lists for admission; when the wait
became too long, many were spared prison altogether. In 1995, remand
prisoners were sent home on more than 5,000 occasions because of a
lack of space (Verhagen 2005, fig. 39).
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TABLE 2
Imprisonment Rates per 100,000 Population, Selected Countries,
1977, 1990, 1999, and 2004
Change Change Change
1999-2004 1990-2004 1977-2004
Country 1977 1990 1999 2004 (%) (%) (%)
Denmark 62 65 67 69.7 4.0 7.2 12.4
England and Wales 81 93 122 140.4 15.1 51 73.3
Finland 115 65 50.5 66 30.7 -1.5 -42.3
France 62 82 88.5 90.5 2.23 10.34 46
Germany 83* 78* 98.3 96.5 -1.8 23.7 16.3
Italy 56 57 9.3 96.9 8.5 70 73
Netherlands 27 44 84 123.5 47 180.68 357.41
Norway 49 57 58.5 65 11.1 14 32.65
Spain 64 NA 114 140.3 23.1 NA 119.2
Sweden 51 58 61.9 81.7 32 40.9 60.2
Switzerland 55 NA 88.5 81.8 -7.6 NA 48.7
SOURCE.-2004: Council of Europe (2005), table 1; 1999: Council of Europe (2001),
table 1; 1990: Council of Europe (1992), table 1; 1977: Kaiser (1984), p. 184.
* West Germany only.
In the 1970s, after a round of prison closings, capacity was very low,
and exceptionally low rates in the mid-twenties were the result. The
comparatively level imprisonment rates shown in figures 1 and 2 in the
1990s occurred at a period of insufficient capacity, and the subsequent
rise coincides with a substantial expansion in capacity. The expansion
after 2003 results in part from abrogation of the one-prisoner, one-cell
policy.
A second explanation is a general turn toward greater severity that
manifested itself throughout the justice system. More suspects were
held in pretrial detention, and the fraction of pretrial detainees in the
total prison population significantly increased. The actors and agencies
that make up the criminal justice system over time sent increasingly
larger percentages of convicted offenders to prison and (for many of-
fenses) for longer times. Between 1985 and 1995, the percentages of
registered crimes resulting in unsuspended prison sentences increased
substantially for violent (16-21 percent), drug (22-34 percent), and
property crimes (13-18 percent) (Tak 2001, table 4.9). The average
prison sentence increased from 59 days in 1970 to 96 in 1980, 152 in
1990, and 197 in 1995 (table 4.11). Between 1980 and 1999, both con-
viction and imprisonment probabilities increased for assaulters and
robbers, as did the odds of receiving a prison sentence and average
16 Michael Tonry and Catrien Bijleveld
days of imprisonment if convicted (Bijleveld and Smit 2004, tables
4-6).
Data on increasing prison capacity and severer punishment practices
give some indication of what is happening, but not why. A growing
comparative and cross-national literature explores determinants of
changing penal policies, focusing on such things as changing crime
rates, public attitudes and anxieties, and criminal justice policies;
deeper changes in social and economic conditions; and evolving cul-
tural norms and sensibilities (Boutellier [2005] has written of these
changes in the Dutch context).
The history of penal policy in the Netherlands remains to be written,
and perforce it will explore such subjects. It is clear that something
fundamental has changed (Downes and van Swaaningen, in this vol-
ume). Van Ruller and Beijers (1995) analyzed Dutch incarceration data,
broadly defined to include adult prisons, juvenile facilities, and mental
institutions, from 1837 to 1992. Their data suggest that something
dramatic happened in the 1970s (see fig. 3). We have added comparable
data through 2005. Aggregate imprisonment rates fell steeply and al-
most continuously from 1837 to 1975 and then changed direction. The
increase since then has not been continuous but would have been had
imprisonment rates not been distorted by changes in capacity, waiting
lists, and the one-prisoner, one-cell rule.
Van Ruller and Beijers describe a number of factors that may have
influenced the post-1975 rise. One is the combination of limited ca-
pacity, the one to a cell policy, and waiting lists. A second is an increase
in the number of serious offenses. A third is harsher sentencing prac-
tices. A fourth is more vigorous enforcement of hard-drug laws. A fifth
is a combination of the Netherlands' role as a transit hub combined
with open borders and easy international mobility, which necessitates
locking up suspects for fear that they may otherwise leave the country.
A sixth and seventh are two "psychological" considerations: that judges
have perceived the Dutch mild penal climate to be out of synch with
those of surrounding countries, and that the climate had changed from
one of compassion for the perpetrator to one of compassion for the
victim, resulting in harsher attitudes toward crime and criminals.
B. Crime Rates
Rates of recorded crime broadly rose in most Western countries
during the 1970s and 1980s, reaching peaks at some point in the early
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to mid-1990s and declining or stabilizing thereafter. Changes in re-
porting and recording took place in all countries during that period,
and some countries changed their criminal codes to redefine offenses
in ways that make comparison of crime rates over time even more
difficult. Homicide, because of its seriousness and the possibility of
validating police data with health system data, and automobile theft,
because insurers typically will not cover a claim unless the loss was
reported to the police, are generally believed to be the most accurate
official crime data. Assaults and sexual offenses are generally believed
to be the offenses least accurately measured by official data because
there have been substantial and repeated changes in social attitudes
and official policies toward both in recent decades that conduce to
higher recording and reporting rates. In general, people have become
less tolerant of violence and unwanted sexual contacts and more likely
to report them to the police. The police in turn have become more
likely to record them as crimes.
Identifying trends in the incidence of serious crimes in the Neth-
erlands is more difficult than in some other countries because of the
nature of some definitions of offenses in Dutch criminal law. For some
of the offenses about which citizens are most concerned, the existing
definitions make trend statistics difficult to compile or interpret. There
is, for example, no separate article for burglaries; they make up about
a fifth of the entries under article 311 ("qualified theft"). There is
likewise no separate offense of motor vehicle thefts; they are classified
sometimes as general theft (art. 310), sometimes under 311, and some-
times under other articles. Dutch victimization surveys and the Inter-
national Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS) in which the Netherlands
participates have working definitions for some of these offenses, but
those definitions have changed over time and are difficult to relate to
the criminal code definitions (Bijleveld and Smit 2004, p. 164).
It is likely that crime trends in the Netherlands in recent decades
followed those in other Western countries, but that is less clear from
official records than is true elsewhere. Figure 4 shows police data on
recorded aggregate property and violent crime rates per 100,000 pop-
ulation aged twelve to seventy-nine years for the years 1960-2004. The
property crime rate rose steadily from 1960 to 1985, reaching a plateau
that lasted through the early 1990s, followed by a sizable fall, an in-
crease to a point lower than the prior peak, and another fall. The
violent crime rate increased throughout the entire period.
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FIG. 4.-Property and violent crime rates per 100,000 population aged twelve to
seventy-nine years, Netherlands, 1960-2004. Sources: CBS Statline, WODC (http://
www.wodc.nl/Cijfers/CriminaliteitenRechtshandhaving/), tables 4.2, 4.3.
It is difficult to know how much of the apparent increases, especially
for violence, is real and how much is the artifactual effect of reporting
and recording changes. Much of the increase in violence rates is almost
certainly the product of changes in police recording practices. During
the period 1980-99, the probability that an assault was reported to the
police increased slightly, but the probability that the reported incident
was recorded as an assault by the police increased threefold (from 19.4
percent in 1980 to 58.1 percent in 1999). For robbery the recording
increase is less (from 5.8 percent in 1980 to 14 percent in 1999) (Bij-
leveld and Smit 2004, tables A3, A4), but still a 150 percent increase.
Assaults and threats are the most frequent violent crimes, and their
numbers drive the total violent crime rate. Trends in recorded violent
crime accordingly probably overstate the increase in violence.
The story for property crimes is much the same. Although levels of
citizen reporting of burglary and motor vehicle theft did not change
much between 1980 and 1999, police recording practices did. For bur-
glary, the probability of police recording of reported offenses nearly
doubled from 22.3 percent in 1980 to 42.1 percent in 1999. For motor
vehicle theft, the recording rate rose from 23.9 percent of reported
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FIG. 5.-Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, 1960-2004. Source: Nieuwbeerta and
Deerenberg (2005).
offenses to 58.1 percent (Bijleveld and Smit 2004, figs. 2a, 2b). Al-
though theft is the most numerous of property crimes, burglary and
motor vehicle thefts also are common. The substantial increases in
recording rates for those offenses, especially in the 1990s, when prop-
erty crime rates were falling, suggest that the falls were real.
In principle, homicide should provide a leading indicator of violence
trends, assuming that the number of homicides is probabilistically re-
lated to the number of violent incidents. Reasons why this assumption
might be incorrect include changes in the circumstances in which
deaths occur (e.g., an increase in the fraction of homicides occurring
in organized crime contexts, changes in weapon lethality such as shifts
from knives to guns or from lower- to higher-caliber guns) and changes
in the effectiveness of medical responses to violence.
Homicide is less likely than other crimes to be susceptible to large
changes in reporting and recording. If homicide is viewed as the tip of
the iceberg of violent offending, research on homicide levels suggests
that violence increased from 1960 through the early 1990s, after which
it stabilized and most recently may have begun to decline. This can be
seen in figure 5, which shows homicide rates per 100,000 population
from 1960 to 2004. From 1965 to 1990, yearly homicide rates increased
nearly threefold, to 1.2 per 100,000, and have remained fairly stable-
since, hovering around a little over 200 per year. Nieuwbeerta and
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Deerenberg (2005) show that the rise took place mainly in the three
largest cities (Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and The Hague) and among
young and adult males. Firearms were involved in an increasing frac-
tion of deaths over this period.
The homicide data thus show a marked rise since 1960, although
not as strong as the rise in police-recorded violent offenses. Plausible
hypotheses, however, can be offered that part of the rise is explained
by the increasing prevalence of firearms (an assault with a gun is more
likely to result in death than are other assaults) and that part is ex-
plained by an increasing proportion of homicides related to otherwise
criminal activities.
Whatever the reasons for the rise, the levels reached in the 1990s
and sustained since then are typical of western European countries.
Most have homicide rates between 1.0 and 1.5 per 100,000 population
(Aebi et al. 2006, tables 1.2.1.4, 1.1.2.5).
From official records, then, it appears that both property and violent
crime increased in the 1970s and 1980s, though considerably less than
official data suggest, and that property crime rates began to fall in the
1990s. It is more difficult to generalize about recent violence trends.
However, under the assumption that homicide is a leading indicator of
violence generally, the stabilization of homicide rates in the early 1990s
and the subsequent slight decline suggest that the true incidence of
violence in society has not been increasing for more than a decade.
Wittebrood and Nieuwbeerta (2006), using victimization data, showed
for the period 1980-2004 for a number of smaller categories of offenses
that most of the rise in recorded crime could be explained by increased
reporting and recording, and only a small proportion by rising crime
levels as such.
C. Victimization Surveys
Data generated by victim surveys, the other source of data on crime
over time, agree with the official data on property crime but disagree
about violence (in contrast to the police data, also showing a decline).
Figure 6 provides aggregate data on victimization rates per 100,000 for
violent and property crimes from 1980 through 2006. Reported victim-
ization levels are fairly stable, decreasing from 16,000 to 14,000 inci-
dents per 100,000 population per year. It shows that reported victim-
ization by property crime declined in the late 1990s. For violent crime,
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FIG. 6.-Victimization violent and property offenses, Netherlands, 1980-2006. Source:
WODC and CBS victim surveys.
it indicates a drop in the mid-1980s followed by another drop in the
mid-1990s to a stable lower level.
Most writers in the Netherlands contend that the victim surveys give
better information and that the rising crime levels indicated by the
official data reflect increased administrative efficiency and, for violent
offending, increased labeling of behavior by victims and officials. There
clearly have been changes in reporting behavior and recording prac-
tices. The overriding difficulty is not knowing how much those changes
have affected apparent crime levels and trends
While an argument can be made that victimization data are more
reliable indicators of trends because they are not distorted by officials'
recording decisions and because often they are based on large samples,
other considerations make them less persuasive. They do not measure
one of the most serious crimes, homicide, and do not report data for
another, rape (the former for obvious reasons and the latter because
rape is too rare an event to obtain credible estimates from victim sur-
veys); what they do measure is heavily biased toward less serious
crimes. There are also questions about their representativeness; re-
sponse rates for Dutch national victimization surveys hover around 50
percent and have gone down steadily over the years. Since the hardest-
to-locate respondents (poor, mobile, living socially disorganized lives)
are the likeliest to be high-rate offenders and victims, nonrepresenta-
tiveness is a nontrivial problem. Figure 6 is derived from data from
severaLsurveys: the WODC victim survey (1973-80), three different
subsequent Statistics Netherlands victim surveys (1981-2004), and the
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latest VeiligsheidsMonitor Rijk victim survey (2005 and 2006). The last
was not synchronized with its predecessors.
However, the ICVS does confirm that victimization in the Nether-
lands has declined since 1989, when that survey was first administered.
Table 3 shows levels of reported victimization per 100,000 residents
for burglary, thefts of and from cars, and theft of personal property
(the sample sizes are too small to generate useful estimates about vi-
olent crimes) for eight western European countries for the years 1988,
1991, 1995, and 1999, including many of those whose imprisonment
rates are included in tables 1 and 2. The two patterns that stand out
for the Netherlands are that reported victimization rates are in the
mainstream and, as in almost every other European country, peaked in
the 1990s and have since fallen. These two patterns are confirmed by
findings from the latest wave of ICVS data collection in 2004 (van Dijk
2006; van Dijk et al. 2007, chap. 2). Aggregate victimization rates in
every western European country participating in the 2004 wave had
fallen substantially from high points in the 1990s.
This brief overview of crime, victimization, and punishment trends
in the Netherlands shows several things: Dutch imprisonment rates
have risen much faster and more steeply than those in other European
countries, and Dutch rates are now at or near the top in Europe; of-
ficial and victimization data indicate that property crime rates have
fallen and violent crime rates have stabilized.
V. Implications for Research
The Netherlands has a rich tradition in criminology and criminal jus-
tice research, and thriving (and rapidly growing) research and teaching
communities (van Swaaningen 2006; Junger-Tas and Junger, in this
volume). Its crime control and punishment policies have consistently
attracted attention from outsiders because of the liberality of its long-
standing policies on drugs and prostitution and because of its gradual,
long-term shift away from having one of the most restrained punish-
ment systems in Europe.
Dutch research is reasonably ample and impressively vibrant in a
number of subjects, notably including organizational and white-collar
crime (e.g., van de Bunt and Huisman, in this volume), organized crime
(Kleemans, in this volume), juvenile delinquency (Weerman, in this
volume), juvenile justice (Junger-Tas 2004), and immigration and crime
TABLE 3
Victimization per 100,000 Inhabitants, 1988, 1991, 1995, and
1999: Selected Offenses and Countries
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. . . 1,500 1,500 2,300
1,100 1,600 1,200
Car-Related Crime
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1,100 1,350 1,110 1,340
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2,340 2,860 2,540 2,350
2,520 3,120 2,640
. . . 1,390 1,690 1,960
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4,300 4,000 . . . 4,800
4,000 5,000 5,500 5,700
5,000 3,900 3,600 3,900
4,200 . . . 4,800 3,100
4,900 6,100 5,800 5,500
5,200 4,900 9,000 6,000
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5,400 5,800 7,200
5,700 . . . 6,800 5,400
Contact Crimes
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(Engbersen, van der Leun, and de Boom, in this volume). Work in
these areas matches that anywhere else in the world in vigor, sophis-
tication, and imagination.
On a second set of subjects, the literatures and research communities
are not yet large but are promising and will justify sustained investment
over time in strategic programs of research and in the career devel-
opment of subject matter specialists. Examples include urbanization
and crime (e.g., Bruinsma, in this volume), sex offenses and offenders
(e.g., Bijleveld, in this volume), violent and serious offending (e.g.,
Loeber and Slot, in this volume), and crime and human development
(e.g., Blokland and Nieuwbeerta 2006).
On some other subjects, however, notwithstanding the existence of
important individual studies, the corpus of research is comparatively
meager and the number of involved researchers is small. Examples
include gender and crime, costs of crime, cost-benefit and effectiveness
studies, and treatment effectiveness.
There are, however, two major general areas in which Dutch re-
search is conspicuously underdeveloped. The first is the operation of
the criminal justice system. There is an astonishing lack of investment
in baseline empirical studies of the operations of the police, prosecu-
tors, courts, prisons, and community penalty systems and in the effec-
tiveness of policy changes and experiments. In a country that has been
increasing its use of imprisonment steadily for thirty years, it is re-
markable that little important research on the operation of prisons and
the effects of imprisonment has been carried out in recent decades. It
is similarly remarkable in a country in which the public prosecutor
occupies a considerably more powerful and influential role than pros-
ecutors in most other countries that prosecutors receive so little re-
search scrutiny. Similar observations could be offered about Dutch po-
lice, judges, and community corrections. There have been individual
publications of note (e.g., van Koppen 2003; van Koppen and Schalken
2004), but none of these literatures are large.
Prison research can be used to illustrate the current lack of research
and (therefore) knowledge about critically important subjects. Despite
the example of extensive literatures in the English-speaking countries
and Scandinavia on life inside prisons, on inmate and staff subcultures,
on how they have changed over time, and on how they relate to prison
management and to prisoners' postrelease behavior, there is no modern
Dutch research. Despite the example of large international literatures
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on how prisoners adapt to and cope with prison life and on the prison's
effects on their mental and physical health, there is no modern re-
search. There is not a rigorous evaluative literature on the effects of
recent changes in prison regime (e.g., greater austerity, multiple celling,
longer sentences) on prison management, prisoner well-being, or pris-
oners' postrelease behavior. Fundamental baseline facts are not known:
for example, concerning the lifetime probability of imprisonment for
men and women and for members of different ethnic groups. There
are no cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness literatures on the use of im-
prisonment compared with other sanctions or compared with other
social policies for dealing with crime (comparing, e.g., the cost-effec-
tiveness of investments in prisons with investments in developmental
and other forms of crime prevention). There is no published research
on the collateral consequences of a prison sentence (or any other sanc-
tion) on prisoners' subsequent employment, earnings, physical and
mental health, or family functioning or on the lives of prisoners' part-
ners and children.
Similar paragraphs could be written about the police, prosecution,
judicial, and community penalty systems. Greatly expanded programs
of research on these subjects are important not only from rationalistic
and humanitarian perspectives. Governments make better choices
when their decisions are based on credible information. Precious little
credible, research-based information is available on criminal justice sys-
tem operations or on the effects of recent policy changes.
Historical studies of crime and justice system operations are a second
area in need of reinvigoration. Ren6 van Swaaningen (2006) recently
showed that historical scholarship on the subjects flowered in the 1990s
but has since gone into hibernation. Historical research, for which the
Netherlands' well-kept archives make it especially well suited, should
be revived. Important work was carried out earlier by Faber (1983),
van Egmond (1993), and van Ruller and Beijers (1995), but little im-
portant work has recently been published. Exceptions are Pieter Spie-
renburg's ongoing research, Croes and Tammes' (2004) landmark study
of the persecution of the Jews in World War II, and Fijnault's (2007)
history of Dutch police. Van Ruller and Beijers in their statistical anal-
yses showed that overall confinement rates fell steadily for a century
and a half and in 1975 changed direction. Explaining why that hap-
pened is but one among many worthy missions for Dutch historians.
A specific modern historical subject that is starkly underresearched
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is the evolution of criminal justice policy in the Netherlands since
World War II. The unprecedented rise in American imprisonment
rates and changes in American criminal justice policies since 1973 have
provoked a sizable literature that documents those developments, at-
tempts to measure their effects, and tries to explain why what happened
happened (e.g., Garland 2001; Tonry 2004a; Simon 2007). The stark
rise in imprisonment and the harshening of English policies since 1993
have provoked similar literatures (e.g., Garland 2001; Ryan 2003;
Tonry 2004b; Jones and Newburn 2006). The toughening of criminal
justice practices in the Netherlands has been going on for as long as
the American toughening, and much longer than the English. Neither
of those countries, however, was ever regarded as an exemplar of en-
lightened criminal justice policies. How and why the Netherlands
moved from exemplifying liberal to exemplifying repressive criminal
justice policies is a story that has not yet fully been told.
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